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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
RICO: PROTECTING U.S. MARKETS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY
Kristen Neller*
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act'
(RICO) was enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat organized crime
in America. Since its enactment, it has been used extensively in both
the civil and criminal arenas. With the participation of foreign corpo-
rations,2 foreign subsidiaries, and foreign actors in general in the U.S.
economy, it is only a matter of time before foreign defendants will be
sued under RICO. This Note will discuss whether RICO should be
applied extraterritorially: that is, whether federal courts should as-
sume jurisdiction over foreign entities as defendants in RICO claims.3
First, RICO's language, legislative history and application by the
courts will be examined. Second, other areas of the law in which ex-
traterritorial applications have been considered by the courts will be
discussed, including antitrust, securities, employment, and environ-
mental laws.4 Finally, RICO will be examined in light of the current
jurisprudential context as created in these other areas. This analysis
will suggest that RICO, based on its underlying intent and its relation
to other areas of the law, should apply extraterritorially, but only after
thorough consideration has been given to concerns of international
comity. 5
* Albion College, B.A., 1990; University of Michigan, J.D., 1992.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
2. The term "foreign corporation" is assumed, for the purposes of this note, to mean "be-
longing to or relating to another sovereign or dominion, as in the expressions 'foreign law,' for-
eign community,' 'foreign minister' and 'foreign territory.'" Bigey v. N.Y. & P.R.S.S. Co., 105
F. 74, 76 (D. N.Y. 1900). The term includes not only corporations organized in foreign nations,
but also associations in foreign countries having the attributes of corporations. Liverpool Ins.
Co. v. Mass., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566, 573 (1870).
3. This note will be limited in discussion to the narrow theoretical question of whether RICO
should be extraterritorially applied and will not address the general jurisdictional issues. For a
choice of law analysis of the extraterritorial application issue, see Larry Kramer, Vestiges of
Beale: ExtraterritorialApplication ofAmerican Law, 1991 Sup. Cr. REv. 179, 223 (arguing for a
federal choice of law system for multinational cases).
4. These four areas of law were chosen for comparison with RICO based on the specific
consideration of the extraterritorial application issue by U.S. courts in these areas.
5. International comity, or the comity of nations, is defined as: "The recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267
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I. RICO
A. Purpose, Language and Application
The purpose, language, and application of RICO suggest that it
should be applied extraterritorially. Congress originally enacted the
statute to combat organized crime in the United States. While consid-
ering whether to enact legislation like RICO, Congress conducted ex-
tensive studies on the effects and activities of organized crime. Among
its findings were: 1) that organized crime was a highly sophisticated
industry that drained the U.S. economy of billions of dollars annually,
2) that the activities of organized crime organizations, because of their
significant economic impact, weakened the stability of the U.S. eco-
nomic system, interfering with free competition and seriously burden-
ing interstate and foreign commerce, and 3) that organized crime
would continue to grow under the then-current legal system because a)
defects in the evidence-gathering process inhibited the production of
legally admissible evidence, and b) existing sanctions were too limited
in scope and impact to deter organized criminal activity.
6
The Senate discussions prior to the enactment of RICO indicate
that Congress viewed organized crime's significant economic power as
the major threat to the United States. The threat of organized crime,
then, was not a threat to the well-being of individuals or to some vague
notion of public safety, but to the health and welfare of the U.S. econ-
omy. Consequently, legislative proposals in response to the threat fo-
cused principally on the economic power base of organized crime.
What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that
will deal .. . with the economic base through which .. . individuals
constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation.
In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power
itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.
7
RICO was formulated, accordingly, to attack the economic power
base of organized crime through the creation of new penal prohibitions
and remedies as well as stiffer sanctions.8
(6th ed. 1990). The consideration of international comity concerns has become increasingly im-
portant in the modem global society. See generally Wolfgang Friedmann, The Role of Interna-
tional Law in the Conduct of International Affairs, 20 INT'L J. 158 (1965) (asserting that the
development of highly destructive weapons, the emergence of new sovereign nations, and the
rapid increase in population require countries to respect international laws).
6. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981).
7. Id. at 591-92 (citing S. REP. No. 91-617 at 79 (1969)).
8. To further fulfill RICO's aggressive role in the fight against organized crime, Congress
made its violation punishable by extensive criminal and civil penalties. The maximum criminal
penalty allowed under RICO is a $25,000 fine and a twenty-year prison sentence. Violators can
also be subject to broadly described property forfeiture provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
Under RICO's civil remedies, successful plaintiffs are awarded treble damages, court costs, and
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The RICO statute is worded broadly, and the scope of its applica-
bility is very loosely defined. The statute prohibits "any person who
has received any income, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of rack-
eteering activity" from using or investing such income, or part thereof,
in "the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."9
Further, it prohibits "any person, through a pattern of racketeering
activity" from acquiring or maintaining "any interest in or control of
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce." 10 Finally, RICO prohibits the direct
or indirect participation in "such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity" by "any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise" so engaged."
Specific key terms within the statute are also broadly stated and
defined. "Person" is defined in RICO to include "any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." 12
Similarly, the term "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."13 "Rack-
eteering activity" covers several activities. Traditional 'mob' activities
are named, including murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, and dealing in obscene matter. 14 Other offenses
within this category include mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of jus-
tice, any offense involving fraud under Title 11, securities fraud, and
"the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs."15 Finally, the "pattern" of racketeering activity required for
action under RICO consists simply of at least two acts of racketeering
activity recurring within any ten year period after the enactment of the
attorney fees. This civil remedy is available to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property"
by a RICO violation of another. Id. § 1964. Finally, courts are also allowed to provide remedies
under civil claims similar to the newly-enacted corporate sentencing guidelines, such as orders of
divestment, prohibitions of business activity, and orders of dissolution or reorganization. Id.
9. Id. § 1962.
10. Id'
11. Id
12. Id § 1961.
13. I ; According to RICO's legislative history, this broad definition is given to insure that
"infiltration of any associative group by any individual or group capable of holding a property
interest can be reached." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4032.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988); Liability is based not just on the "act" of these offenses, but
"any threat involving" them as well. Id.
15. Id
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statute.16
The Supreme Court has interpreted and clarified the language and
scope of the statute. In general, the Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted RICO to effectuate the broad purposes of the statute. The
Court handed down its first major interpretation of RICO in 1981, in
United States v. Turkette.1 7
In Turkette, the Court decided that the term "enterprise" encom-
passed legitimate as well as illegitimate enterprises. The Court dis-
cussed the broad purpose and language of RICO at length, and
concluded, "[i]n view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as
the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Congress never-
theless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organ-
ized crime."18 Most importantly, the court stated that if Congress had
intended a more limited interpretation, it would have included "some
positive sign that the law was . . to reach" only certain activities. 19
Later cases followed Turkette's broad interpretation and expanded
RICO accordingly. In 1985, the Supreme Court explicitly reinforced
the expansive reading of Turkette as appropriate for enforcing Con-
gress's broad purposes in Sedima v. Imrex.20 The Court stated,
"RICO was an aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies and
develop new methods for fighting crime... it is in this spirit that all of
the Act's provisions should be read. '21 Also, the court noted the "ex-
traordinary, if not outrageous," uses to which civil RICO has been
put, in that "it has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought
against 'respected and legitimate' enterprises. ' 22 Nevertheless, the
Court found this broad application consistent with the intent of Con-
gress, and reversed a lower court decision which permitted private ac-
tions under RICO only against defendants who had been convicted on
criminal charges, and only where a 'racketeering injury' had
occurred.23
Most recently, in 1989, the Supreme Court interpreted RICO's
"pattern" requirement in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co.24 In the decision, the Court focused on the broadness of RICO's
16. Id.
17. 452 U.S. 576.
18. Id at 590.
19. Id. at 593.
20. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
21. Id. at 498.
22. Id. at 499.
23. Id.
24. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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language, stating that it "places an outer limit on the concept of a
pattern of racketeering activity that is broad indeed."' 25 Looking to
the statute's purpose and legislative history once again, the Court
found that flexibility was the main intent of Congress in the applica-
tion of RICO: "It is reasonable to infer... that Congress intended to
take a flexible approach, and envisaged that a pattern might be demon-
strated by reference to a range of different ordering principles or rela-
tionships between predicates, within the expansive bounds set."'26
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court limited the "pattern" requirement of
RICO somewhat by including only those racketeering acts that relate
to each other in some way and that amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity.27
The judiciary's flexible interpretation of RICO has spurred the ap-
plication of RICO to several 'enterprises' perhaps unanticipated by
Congress. For example, a federal judge in Philadelphia ruled in 1986
that an abortion clinic could invoke RICO against forty-one anti-abor-
tion activists who allegedly stole or destroyed thousands of dollars
worth of medical equipment.28 The activists apparently had
threatened to use force and eventually broke into the clinic to steal
equipment. Civil RICO has also been used in divorce cases, landlord-
tenant suits and other 'garden-variety' claims.29
These cases and other similar "stretches" of civil RICO have en-
couraged a movement to modify RICO to prevent such expansive ap-
plication. A consensus among the legal and business communities has
advocated that the civil provisions of RICO be revised to narrow its
application.30 Representative Richard Boucher of Virginia voiced the
thoughts of many when he stated, "Civil RICO has been one of the
most badly abused of Federal statutes. It is so broadly drafted that it
could apply to virtually any commercial dispute."' 31 As a response to
the movement for revision, the last three Congressional sessions have
examined the possibility of reform. However, none of the proposed
bills of revision succeeded; they were merely "subject[ed] to a fury of
25. Id. at 237.
26. Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 239-43 for a general discussion of this issue.
28. Nancy Blodgett, New RICO Twist: Damaged Abortion Clinic Sues, 72 A.B.A. J. 26
(1986).
29. Joan Biskupic, RICO: Perennial Legislation, Perennial Roadblocks, CONG. Q., May 4,
1991, at 1135.
30. Id
31. Stephen A. Holmes, Congress to Take New Look at Racketeering Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
14, 1990, at 4.
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debate, then quietly left behind."' 32 Passage of a revised civil RICO
does not seem likely in the near future. Several key House Committee
Chairmen have opposed any revised RICO legislation brought before
the House, and there has yet to be any such proposed legislation in the
Senate.33
Thus RICO stands, with ambiguous language, broadly defined and
interpreted. The statute, originally conceived as a governmental
weapon against organized crime, has become a widely used part of
private plaintiffs' arsenals against corporate criminal activity. Fur-
thermore, RICO allows private parties to enforce a number of 'garden-
variety' claims. The judicial decisions demonstrate that RICO encom-
passes the enforcement of the statutory prohibitions in virtually all
situations. This expansive enforcement scheme should include extra-
territorial as well as domestic application.
B. Extraterritorial Application
Taken together, the congressionally mandated purpose, broad lan-
guage, and flexible applications of RICO suggest that the statute, on
its face, should be applied extraterritorially. First, the extraterritorial
application is completely consistent with the purpose of RICO. In
brief, RICO was enacted to combat the activities of certain entities,
organized crime organizations or otherwise, because their activities
were having a significant negative effect on the U.S. economy. Thus,
the activities of foreign entities which likewise negatively impact the
U.S. economy seem a logical target for the application of the statute.
In fact, the purpose of the statute necessitates extraterritorial applica-
tion. In order to achieve the statute's goal of eliminating the negative
effects of organized crime, RICO must apply to all entities engaging in
the proscribed activities in ways which affect the United States. This
includes both domestic and foreign entities.
Second, the broad language of RICO is similarly consistent with its
extraterritorial application. The statute itself requires that it be "liber-
32. Biskupic, supra note 29, at 1135. The most recent proposal, H.R. 1717, sponsored by
Rep. William J. Hughes (D-N.J.), placed responsibility for limiting civil RICO application in the
hands of the trial judge. Id. at 1136. First, the bill narrowed the definition of "pattern" to that
espoused recently by the Supreme Court in H.JIna, requiring relation and continuity. Second,
the criminal RICO provisions were to lie untouched, as would civil claims brought based on
conduct already found to be criminal. However, cases not brought on this basis were not to be
brought under civil RICO unless three conditions were met as determined by the trial judge: 1)
that the defendant was a major participant in the conduct producing injury, 2) that a triple
damage remedy is found appropriate considering the magnitude of the plaintiff's injury, and 3)
that a need to deter conduct like that alleged exists. If the trial judge determines that any of
these three conditions are not met, he or she is expected to dismiss the case altogether. Id
33. Id.
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ally construed so as to effectuate its purposes."3 4 Also, the statute, as
discussed above, is worded quite broadly; it avoids clearly defining
such key terms as "person," "enterprise," and "pattern," and neglects
to clearly articulate the intended scope. This vagueness has allowed
"expansive interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court, thereby
promoting its extraterritorial application. For example, the Court in
Turkette declared an unlimited definition of "enterprise" by recogniz-
ing that if Congress had meant its definition to be limited, it would
have so stated. 35 Therefore, "enterprise" should not be limited to the
inclusion of domestic entities, but should also include foreign entities.
Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized in Sedima the "aggressive"
nature of RICO, and that its language and scope was to be interpreted
"in this spirit," 36 as well as the need for "flexibility" in determining
the scope of the statute's applicability in H.J Inc..37 Such an aggres-
sive and flexible application of RICO would logically encompass appli-
cation of the statute to foreign entities. Therefore, the broad language
of RICO is consistent with its extraterritorial application.
Finally, the expanded applications of RICO, and of civil RICO in
particular, are consistent with its extraterritorial application as well.
It only seems natural that courts would be willing to sanction the ap-
plication of RICO for use against foreign entities who have partici-
pated in or performed traditional "racketeering" enterprises3 when
they have sanctioned its application to so many non-traditional do-
mestic enterprises. Also, the failure of reformers to revise civil RICO
suggests that the statute's applications will not be limited at any time
in the near future so as to foreclose extraterritorial application.
II. OTHER U.S. LAWS
In constrast to RICO, there are areas of law for which the issue of
extraterritorial application has been explicitly raised. They include
antitrust, securities, employment, and environmental laws. The fol-
lowing is a brief overview of these areas of law with respect to the
judicial treatment given the issue of extraterrritorial application.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 904 (1988)(provision ancillary to RICO).
35. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590.
36. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498.
37. Id.
38. "Traditional enterprises" refers to those originally contemplated by Congress, such as
organized crime organizations and corrupt corporate entities. See supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text.
RICO
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A. Antitrust
It is well-settled today that American antitrust laws can be applied
extraterritorially. 39 The first case to address the question of extraterri-
torial application was American Banana v. United Fruit4° in 1909.
The Court refused to apply U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially. Jus-
tice Holmes dismissed the plaintiff's claims briefly because the actual
act in violation of U.S. law had been performed by a foreign govern-
ment and not by the domestic party. Relying on principle echoing the
Act of State doctrine,41 Holmes upheld in his decision "the general
and almost universal rule that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." 42 Although the American Banana decision has not
been officially overturned, several subsequent decisions have limited its
ruling to Act of State grounds only.43
The next case to consider extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-
trust laws followed just two years later. In United States v. American
Tobacco,44 the U.S. government charged that defendants, including
twenty-nine individuals, sixty-five American corporations, and two
English corporations, were engaged in a conspiracy to restrain inter-
state and foreign trade in tobacco and tobacco products, and were at-
tempting and had actually achieved a monopoly. In its prayer for
relief, the government requested "that the British-American Tobacco
Co. be adjudged an unlawful instrumentality created solely for carry-
ing into effect the obligations and purposes of said contract, combina-
tion and conspiracy . . . and that it be enjoined from engaging in
interstate or foreign trade and commerce within the jurisdiction of the
United States."' 45 The Court granted the government's request, as-
39. The antitrust laws with regard to which the question of extraterritorial application has
been most often discussed are the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988)) and the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-27 (1988)). The Sherman Act declares "every contract, combination...
or conspiracy" which restrains trade to be illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Clayton Act prohib-
its price discrimination activities and noncompetitive agreements among competitors. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-14, 19-27 (1988).
40. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
41. The Act of State doctrine was first established by the Supreme Court in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897): "The courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another, done within its own territory." Id at 252. This doctrine was most
recently upheld in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
42. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356.
43. In fact, in the next case involving foreign defendants and their alleged violation of U.S.
antitrust laws, the court did not even cite American Banana, presumably because the conduct in
question was not performed by a sovereign government, but by private parties. United States v.
American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 149.
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suming jurisdiction over all defendants, including the two British cor-
porations, without questioning at all the Court's jurisdiction over the
parties.46
The Supreme Court explicitly examined the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws a few years later in a dispute over trans-
portation routes in and out of the United States. In United States v.
Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co.47, the U.S. government al-
leged that the defendants, both U.S. and Canadian corporations, mo-
nopolized transportation routes between ports in the continental
United States, Canada and Alaska. Because the disputed transporta-
tion route lay partially outside U.S. boundaries, the Court had to as-
sume extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign route portions and
the foreign defendants to hear the claim. The Court recognized some
jurisdictional limits, stating "we may not control foreign citizens or
corporations operating in foreign territory. ' 48 Nevertheless, the Court
explicitly rejected the claim that the law could have no extraterritorial
application at all. If that were the case, it reasoned, no country would
have jurisdiction over the transportation routes. The Court held that
the antitrust laws were enforceable against foreign entities participat-
ing in illegal combinations within the United States.49 However, the
holding only covered the operations actually occurring in U.S. terri-
tory. Thus, the U.S. antitrust laws were applied against the foreign
defendants for their operations inside the U.S. border.
Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws reached its peak
when Judge Learned Hand heard the case United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America 50 (ALCOA) in 1945. This case was monumental in
that, in addition to explicitly abandoning American Banana and its
strict territorial doctrine, the court delineated a clear test for deter-
mining under exactly what circumstances a U.S. court could assert
jurisdiction over foreign defendants or conduct occurring abroad as
part of an antitrust claim.
In ALCOA, the government claimed that the Aluminum Company
of America (ALCOA) and Aluminum Limited, a Canadian company,
had conspired with European producers of aluminum to impose quo-
tas on imports of aluminum into the United States and to restrain in-
terstate and foreign commerce in aluminum. Further, Aluminum
Limited and five European aluminum producers comprised a Swiss
46. Id. at 184-88.
47. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
48. Id. at 106.
49. Id.
50. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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corporation which, according to quotas previously set, were alleged to
have allocated the amount of aluminum to be produced.51
Judge Hand easily found the court to have jurisdiction over the
Canadian and Swiss companies, stating it to be "settled law.., that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for [anti-competitive] conduct outside its borders that has con-
sequences within its borders if the conduct is intended to and actually
does have an effect on United States imports or exports which the state
reprehends."'5 2 Thus, a two-prong test was delineated. A U.S. court
may apply U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially for violations occur-
ring outside U.S. borders, so long as the violative conduct: 1) is in-
tended to have harmful effects and 2) actually has had such effects.53
Once the intent of the defendants is shown, the burden shifts to the
defendants to show that actual effects did not occur.
54
Judge Hand found the two-prong test to be satisfied in the AL-
COA case5 5 and held the Canadian and Swiss companies liable. U.S.
courts have widely accepted the so-called "effects" test pronounced in
the ALCOA decision as the authoritative standard for determining
whether jurisdiction lies for extraterritorial antitrust claims. 56
In addition to the "effects" test, further definition has been given to
the jurisprudence with regard to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws. Courts since ALCOA have realized that the effect on
American commerce should not, by itself, suffice to allow the extrater-
ritorial application of US. laws, but that foreign interests should also
be taken into consideration. As former Attorney General Katzenbach
stated, "[a]nything that affects the external trade and commerce of the
United States also affects the trade and commerce of other nations,
and may have far greater consequences for others' than for the United
States." 57
Evidence for this proposition may be found in certain foreign legis-
51. Id. at 442.
52. Id. at 443.
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id.
55. Judge Hand implied that general intent was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test,
pointing out that it was sufficient for the defendants in the case at hand to have merely "ex-
pected" or "supposed" harmful effects to result from their behavior. Id.
56. The Alcoa opinion was declared a final, unappealable judgment due to the fact that a
quorum of the Supreme Court was unavailable. The appeal to the Second Circuit was certified,
authorizing it to hear cases "in lieu of a decision by the Supreme Court." Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1161 n.46 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 29, the statute granting the Second Circuit special jurisdiction).
57. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976)(quoting
Nicholas Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1150 (1956)).
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lation, specifically termed "blocking legislation." Several foreign na-
tions have enacted blocking legislation in response to the U.S.
extraterritorial application of its laws, antitrust laws in particular.58
Blocking statutes hinder the ability of American litigants to acquire
evidence necessary for their suits and render the enforcement of any
judgments obtained abroad ineffective. 59 For example, the blocking
legislation passed in the United Kingdom prohibits granting requests
for evidence made by foreign authorities and prevents British courts
from enforcing certain damage awards.60 Some of the statutes which
have proven quite extensive and powerful include "clawback" provi-
sions, which allow defendants to recover damages paid by them pursu-
ant to a foreign judgment through the attachment of assets the foreign
plaintiff may have in that country,61 rendering the suit and judgment
completely ineffective.
Specifically with regard to the antitrust area, courts have acknowl-
edged and attempted to consider such international concerns and
avoid retaliatory actions. For example, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
pronounced the "effects" test of ALCOA to be inadequate in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica 62 because it does not ad-
dress the relevant international interests of each case. The court stated
that "[t]he effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider
other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the
full nature of the relationship between the actors and the country. '63
The Third Circuit also declared the inadequacy of a sole "effects" con-
sideration in Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp..64
In each decision, the "effects" test of ALCOA was recognized to be
the authoritative standard for deciding the validity of extraterritorial
application. However, these courts suggested further considerations
be made after the two-prong ALCOA test was satisfied. The additional
considerations, to be evaluated and balanced in each individual case,
58. Blocking legislation has been enacted by the following countries in response to the U.S.
application of antitrust laws extraterritorially: Great Britain, Australia, Canada, the Nether-
lands, France, Sweden, the Phillippines, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, Ger-
many, and Finland. Warren Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commerce and
Antitrust Legislation: A View from "Down Under," 16 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 853, 872
(1983). For a more specific discussion of such legislation, see John J. Cannon III, Foreign Statu-
tory Response to Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 1 DICK. INT'L L.
ANN. 125, 155 (1982).
59. Pengilley, supra note 58, at 872-73.
60. Cannon, supra note 58, at 144.
61. Id. at 145.
62. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12.
63. Id.
64. Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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include: (a) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (b) the
nationality of the parties; (c) the relative importance of the alleged
violation of conduct as compared to that abroad; (d) the availability of
a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there; (e) the existence
of an intent to harm or affect U.S. commerce and the forseeability of
the harm or effect; (f) the possible effect upon foreign relations if the
court were to exercise jurisdiction and grant relief; (g) whether the
court can make its order effective; (h) whether an order for relief
would be acceptable in the United States if made by the foreign na-
tions under similar circumstances; and (i) whether a treaty existing
between the affected nations has addressed the issue.65 These sug-
gested considerations have been accepted and applied in later deci-
sions.6 6 This expansion of the ALCOA test reflects a move by the
courts to address comity concerns in the extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws.
The jurisprudence with regard to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws has been well delineated by the courts. Courts
have accepted extraterritorial application as appropriate when the
two-prong ALCOA "effects" test has been satisfied. Recent cases fur-
ther suggest that relevant international interests be considered as well
through a balancing of several specific factors. In general, courts ex-
amining the issue of extraterritorial application in the antitrust area
have readily accepted such application and have willingly applied U.S.
antitrust laws against foreign entities.
B. Securities
As in the antitrust area, the extraterritorial application of federal
securities laws has been widely accepted by courts.67 The first signifi-
cant case to address the question of extraterritorial application came
before the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.68 In this
shareholder derivative suit, the plaintiff alleged that the directors of
the defendant corporation had authorized the sale of the corporation's
treasury stock to a Canadian corporation for inadequate compensation
after having been informed that the corporation had valuable oil prop-
erty. The court affirmed the summary judgment entered below in the
65. Id. at 1297-98; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
66. Zenith, 494 F. Supp. at 1183 n.46; Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Air-
lines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
67. Most cases arising under federal securities law having extraterritorial implications con-
cern the fraud provisions of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
68. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
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District Court because the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of
proof for a Rule lOb-5 violation.69 Nonetheless, because the sales
transaction had occurred entirely in Canada, the court discussed at
length the extraterritorial application of Rule lOb-5.
In addressing the issue of extraterritorial application, the court dis-
cussed Section 30 of the Securities and Exchange Act 70 (Exchange
Act) covering Foreign Securities Exchanges. Section 30 establishes
the extent to which the Exchange Act applies to persons affecting se-
curities transactions through foreign exchanges. 71 The purpose of the
section is to allow persons in the securities business to sell and
purchase securities outside the U.S. without having to follow Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure and registration re-
quirements. 72 Most importantly, the SEC is given authority to take
action under Section 30 to regulate those transactions for which it is
necessary so as to prevent evasion of the Exchange Act as a whole.73
In reliance on this, the court found extraterritorial application of the
Exchange Act to be appropriate when necessary to protect American
investors. The court stated,
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterri-
torial application in order to protect domestic investors who have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the
domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transac-
tions in American securities. In our view ... the specific language of
Section 30 [does not] show Congressional intent to preclude application
of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the
United States which are affected outside the United States, when extra-
territorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American
investors.74
Accordingly, the court held that extraterritorial application of the Ex-
change Act was appropriate "at least when the transactions involve
stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange, and are
detrimental to the interests of American investors. ' 75
The Second Circuit revisited the issue in 1972 in Leasco Data
Processing Equip. v. Maxwell.76 Under this Rule lOb-5 claim, the de-
fendants were alleged to have conspired to cause Leasco, an American
company, to buy shares of stock from a British company controlled by
69. Id. at 209.
70. Id. at 207.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 206.
75. Id. at 208.
76. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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the defendant, a British citizen, at prices in excess of their true value.77
All of the alleged fraudulent conduct occurred abroad, as well as the
purchase or sale of the securities in question. Acknowledging
Schoenbaum, Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, found the lan-
guage of the Exchange Act "too inconclusive to lead us to believe that
Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct throughout the
world in every instance where an American company bought or sold a
security. ' 78 Judge Friendly declared that the court "would be hard
pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum" in such a
case.
79
Nonetheless, the court found extraterritorial application necessary
in the case to effectuate the Exchange Act's overall purpose and held
the defendants liable. Judge Friendly emphasized that the overall pur-
pose of the Exchange Act was to protect against fraud in the sale or
purchase of securities, whether or not they were traded on established
United States markets.8 0 Accordingly, the court concluded, "we can-
not perceive any reason why [Congress] should have wished to limit
the protection to securities of American issuers. 81 In the case at
hand, some of the alleged fraudulent conduct was found to have oc-
curred in the United States; enough, in fact, that Judge Friendly con-
sidered the foreign conduct to be "an essential link" in the overall
fraud.8 2 Although the parties executed the allegedly fraudulent con-
tract in England, the defendants made initial misrepresentations in the
United States. According to the court, these initial misrepresentions
caused the plaintiffs to fall prey to the fraudulent scheme.8 3 Thus,
extraterritorial application was necessary to effectuate the Exchange
Act's purposes and protect American investors. Judge Friendly wrote,
While, as earlier stated, we doubt that impact on an American company
and its shareholders would suffice to make the statute applicable if the
misconduct had occurred solely in England. We think it tips the scales
in favor of applicability when substantial misrepresentations were made
in the United States.8 4
The "essential link" language served the same purpose as the "effects"
test in the antitrust cases: it justified the court's assertion of extraterri-
77. Id. at 1330.
78. Id. at 1334.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1335-36.
81. Id. at 1336.
82. Id. at 1335.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1337.
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torial jurisdiction. The court simply substituted a finding of U.S. con-
tacts for evidence of actual effects.
In 1975, the Second Circuit again addressed the issue of extraterri-
torial applicability in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc..8 5 In this deriva-
tive suit, American purchasers of securities in a Canadian corporation
sued the corporate officers and shareholders for their failure to reveal
material facts in the corporation's prospectus and for common law
fraud. The relevant jurisdictional facts went beyond both the
Schoenbaum and Leasco fact situations:8 6 The corporations involved
were not U.S. corporations, and the alleged fraudulent conduct which
occurred in the United States was of minimal importance, being
merely preparatory in nature.8 7 Initially, Judge Friendly, again writ-
ing for the majority, appeared sympathetic to the investors, declaring
that "Congress did not mean the United States to be used as a base for
fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are foreigners. 88
In the end, however, he held that the unique fact situation of the case
was not alone sufficient to make extraterritorial application
appropriate.8 9
Judge Friendly, in his analysis of the case, focused on the effects of
the sales transactions on U.S. commerce, adopting a stance con-
sciously parallel to the Alcoa two-prong "effects" test:90 "Acts done
outside the jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detri-
mental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the
harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed
in getting him within its power." 91 He found no such intentions ex-
isting merely when "in the long run there was an adverse effect on this
country's general economic interests or on American securities prices
.* .or American investors generally."192 Rather, for effects to be
found, fraudulent conduct abroad must result in injury to purchasers
or sellers of securities in whom the United States has an interest.
Judge Friendly also emphasized the importance of direct causation,
holding that the federal securities laws did not apply to losses from
sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States where acts in
the United States did not directly cause such losses.93 Essentially, the
85. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
86. Id. at 985-86.
87. Id. at 986.
88. IM at 987.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 989.
91. Id. at 988 (quoting Strasshein v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1911)).
92. IM at 989.
93. Id at 993.
RICO
Michigan Journal of International Law
direct causation argument allowed the court to deny the protection of
U.S. securities laws to foreigners unless the culpable acts actually oc-
cur within the United States.
A few years later, the Third Circuit continued the analysis of the
proper extraterritorial appliction of U.S. securities laws by expanding
upon the Bersch holding. In Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Kasser,94 the SEC tried to invoke jurisdiction over defendants alleg-
edly engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving misrepresentations
about the purchase and sale of securities within the United States.95
The unique facts in this case stretched the issue beyond Bersch: the
sole victim in this case was a foreign corporation; the fraud had little if
any impact within the United States; no securities in question were
traded on a U.S. market; there was no sale to any U.S. citizen; and the
sales made did not have any impact on the domestic market. Despite
the tenuous ties of the case to traditional U.S. jurisdictions, the court
allowed the action by the SEC by finding that a significant amount of
the alleged fraudulent conduct had occurred in the United States.96
In its decision, the court relied almost exclusively on traditional
'territorial' doctrine, and specifically on Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
which most recently reaffirmed the traditional territorial doctrine as
extended to the securities laws.97 In addition to the territorial doc-
trine, the court also relied on the Second Circuit's line of cases, includ-
ing its broad interpretation of the securities laws and congressional
intent.98
More significant to the issue of extraterritorial application than its
holding, however, the Kasser court implicitly recognized the impor-
tance of considering relevant foreign interests and international con-
cerns when determining if extraterritorial application is appropriate in
a given situation. This recognition is evidenced by the policy reasons
given in support for its decision. 99 First, the court emphasized one of
the main goals of the securities fraud provisions, deterrence of fraudu-
lent behavior. The Kasser court noted that, without extraterritorial
94. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
95. Id. at 110-11.
96. Id. at 111-12, 115.
97. Id. at 112-13 ("[c]onduct within the United States is alone sufficient from a jurisdictional
standpoint to apply the federal [securities] statutes." (quoting Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d
591 (3d Cir. 1976))).
98. Specifically, the court refers to the Bersch and the Leasco cases. Also, the court gave
great deference to the Second Circuit in the securities area in general: "The prior pronounce-
ments of this Court and those of the Second Circuit, a Court with special expertise in matters
pertaining to securities, lend great support for a holding of jurisdiction here." Id. at 115.
99. Id. at 116.
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application, it would be creating "a haven for... defrauders and ma-
nipulators... to deny such jurisdiction may embolden those who wish
to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers to use the United
States as a base of operations." 100 Further, by allowing the SEC to
proceed in this case, "this Court will enhance the ability of the SEC to
police vigorously the conduct of securities dealings within the United
States."101
Second, the court looked to its decision's effect on the foreign legal
communities. The court hoped that its tough policing of securities
fraud would encourage other nations to do the same. In addition, the
court feared that if it did not extend jurisdiction under this claim,
"[s]ome countries might decline to act against individuals and corpo-
rations seeking to transport securities fraud to the United States."102
The decision to assert jurisdiction was a way to avoid making the
United States a safe place for foreigners to conduct criminal
activity. 103
These cases demonstrate that the courts have extended extraterri-
torial jurisdiction to enable the enforcement of U.S. securities laws.
The reasoning is similar to that used in the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws. Although the securities cases utilize an "essen-
tial link" test rather than the antitrust "effects" test, both tests serve
the purpose of establishing sufficient U.S. concern to justify extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. In addition, the securities cases have followed the
antitrust cases in addressing international comity issues before enforc-
ing U.S. laws against foreign entities.
C. Employment
In marked contrast with the antitrust and securities areas, courts
have established a clear presumption against the extraterritorial appli-
cation of American employment regulations. The Supreme Court first
examined the question of extraterritorial application in this area in the
landmark case, Foley Bros. v. Filard. 104 In Foley, the Court considered
the question of whether the Federal Eight-Hour Law105 applied to
work performed under a contract between the United States and a pri-
vate contractor on construction projects to be completed in Iraq and
Iran. The Court refused to extend the federal regulation to such a
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
105. 40 U.S.C. § 324 (1988).
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case. First, the Court emphasized the purely domestic focus of the
legislation. It recognized Congress's concerns as solely the domestic
labor market and its conditions for employees. 10 6
Second, based on this domestic focus, the Court relied on the terri-
torial limitations pronounced in Blackmer v. United States 0 7 to deny
extraterritorial application of the Eight-Hour Law. Blackmer held
that, absent a contrary intent by Congress, legislation is presumed to
be applicable only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. As the Court could find no evidence in the language of the
Eight-Hour Law or in its legislative history to overcome the presump-
tion,108 it concluded:
The absence of any distinction between citizen and alien labor indicates
to us that the statute was intended to apply only to those places where
the labor conditions of both citizens and alien employees are a probable
concern of Congress. Such places do not include foreign countries such
as Iraq and Iran.10 9
Therefore, extraterritorial application of the Eight-Hour Law was
denied.
Ten years later the Supreme Court examined the possible extrater-
ritorial application of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo.110 The controversy in this case
arose over the picketing of a foreign ship, operated entirely by foreign
seamen under foreign articles, while the vessel was temporarily docked
in an American port. American unions, to which the foreign seamen
did not belong, participated in the picketing.11' The Court, as in Fo-
ley, looked for some evidence of congressional intent within the statute
itself or its legislative history, to overcome the presumption pro-
nounced in Blackmer. Despite its emphasis on the statute's language,
the Court found the primarily domestic focus of the LMRA to be con-
trolling, stating, "the whole background of the Act is concerned with
industrial strife between American employers and employees." 112
Thus, the presumption against extraterritorial application was again
upheld.
Most recently, in 1991, the Supreme Court heard a case concern-
ing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 1 3 in which it conclusively
106. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285-86.
107. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
108. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
109. Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
110. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
111. Id at 142.
112. Id at 143-44.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
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adopted the presumption against extraterritorial application of em-
ployment regulations. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v. Arabian American Oil, the plaintiff was fired while working in Saudi
Arabia for a Delaware corporation and brought suit claiming the ter-
mination was based on discrimination of his race, religion and national
origin.1 1 4 Applying analysis similar to that found in the Foley and
Benz decisions, the Court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's claim be-
cause of the lack of evidence showing congressional intent for extrater-
ritorial application of the Civil Rights Act, stating "had congress
intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have addressed the sub-
ject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures" directly. 115
Thus, the presumption against extraterritorial application of em-
ployment regulations has been consistently reinforced. In fact, courts
have rejected every claim of such jurisdiction concerning employment
statutes since the decision in Foley Bros,1 16 including the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 117 the Railway Labor Act, 118 the National La-
bor Relations Act, 119 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.120 Moreover,
even where Congress has explicitly extended legislation to extraterrito-
rial application, courts have avoided following this mandate. For ex-
ample, Congress specifically amended the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967121 in 1984 to include "trade...
among the several States; or between a State and any place outside
thereof. ..,122 Yet the Seventh Circuit, for example, in Pfeiffer v.
Win. Wrigley Jr. Co.,12 3 refused to apply the ADEA against a foreign
defendant.
In Pfeiffer, an American plaintiff brought suit against a German
subsidiary with which he had been employed because his employment
had been immediately terminated upon his sixty-fifth birthday. The
case was brought in 1985, after the adoption of the amendment to the
Age Discrimination Act, yet the court refused to allow jurisdiction
due to the amendment's non-retroactive status. 124 Judge Posner, curi-
114. 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
115. Id. at 1234.
116. Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome:" Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 618 (1990).
117. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
118. Id. §§ 151-64 (1988).
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1988).
120. Id. § 206.
121. Id. §§ 621-34.
122. Turley, supra note 116, at 625 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(g) (1982))(emphasis added).
123. 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985).
124. Id. at 559.
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ously enough, however, in writing for the majority stressed the signifi-
cance of the domestic focus of ADEA, despite the recently adopted
amendment clearly evidencing Congress's intent to apply the ADEA
extraterritorially. 125 Thus, the presumption against the extraterritoral
application of U.S. employment laws has held steadfast, despite recent
efforts of Congress to abolish the presumption.
D. Environment
The same practically irrebuttable presumption against extraterrito-
rial application of employment regulations applies to environmental
laws as well. 126 Consideration of this issue has focused primarily on
the National Environmental Policy Act 127 (NEPA) of 1969.128 The
NEPA was drafted as an "Environmental Bill of Rights," assigning
federal government agencies the responsibility of overseeing govern-
ment projects under their control that might have harmful environ-
mental effects. 129 In the statute, Congress used very broad language,
not mentioning any jurisdictional limits, and stating a broad purpose:
"recognizing the.., critical importance of restoring and maintaining
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man
... it is the continuing policy.., to create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony."' 130
The statute specifically recognizes the international concerns of envi-
ronmental protection, requiring agencies operating under the statute
to "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmen-
tal problems."' 131
Despite this seemingly permissive language, most courts have dis-
missed extraterritorial application of NEPA very briefly.132 One case
in particular, however, discussed the issue extensively. The District of
Columbia Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission,133 (NRDC), considered the application of the
statute to a request for a nuclear reactor permit in the Phillippines.
Not only did the court find the evidence of congressional intent in the
125. Id. at 556.
126. The following discussion on the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws
is limited to the issue's treatment in U.S. courts. This note will not address the issue with respect
to U.S. foreign policy or international trade negotiations.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
128. Turley, supra note 116, at 628.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(A) (1982)).
131. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1982)) (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 629.
133. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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statute and legislative history insufficient to override the generally es-
tablished presumption 134 against extraterritorial application, but it
adopted an even tougher standard to rebut the presumption in the fu-
ture.135 A clear expression of intent by Congress is not enough to
override the presumption. Rather, future plaintiffs will have to show
"an unequivocal mandate from Congress" for the courts to have juris-
diction.136 Further, the decision declared exceptions that will apply to
any such 'unequivocal mandate' which, in effect, foreclose the possibil-
ity of extraterritorial application of any environmental legislation in
the future. They include: 1) where conduct occurs outside the United
States, 2) where the conduct does not affect, or is not intended to af-
fect, interests within the United States, or 3) where the conduct was
not of nationals of the United States.137 Thus, the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws appears
to have been firmly cemented into the present jurisprudence.
III. COMPARISON TO RICO
The extraterritorial application of RICO seems a logical inevitabil-
ity due to its likeness to several aspects of the antitrust and securities
laws applied extraterritorially by courts. First, RICO is more similar
with regard to the purpose behind its enactment and its intended focus
to laws in the antitrust and securities areas which have been applied
extraterritorially than those in the environmental and employment ar-
eas which have not. The purpose behind the enactment of RICO as
well as its broad application by the courts is analogous to that of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts in antitrust law. Each were enacted by
Congress to combat harmful influences on the U.S. economy: with
RICO, racketeering influences and antitrust, anticompetitive influ-
ences. Courts have applied each of the statutes broadly, sometimes to
situations not originally comtemplated by Congress. Similarly, the
purpose behind the enactment of RICO is comparable to that of Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act. Congress adopted Rule
lOb-5 to combat securities fraud and protect American investors and
the market as a whole, while RICO was enacted to combat racketeer-
ing activity and protect American businesses and industry. For each
statute, the prohibited activity's impact on the U.S. economy as a
whole was the primary concern of Congress. Courts have applied both
RICO and Rule lOb-5 broadly and to circumstances seemingly outside
134. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285-88.
135. Turley, supra note 116, at 630-31.
136. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1357.
137. Id.; Turley, supra note 116, at 631.
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the realm of original contemplation by Congress. The broad judicial
interpretations of these statutes may reflect expansions in the market
and court attempts to address economic realities.
By contrast, the purpose behind employment and environmental
laws are quite different, and their focus is more narrow than that of
RICO. Employment laws have been enacted by Congress to prevent
actions by employers harmful to individual employees. While envi-
ronmental laws appear to have been enacted to prevent activities
which harm the environment so to protect mankind as a whole from
environmental hazards, the statutes have traditionally focused on the
impact of environmental legal violations only on particular individuals
or small geographical areas in a domestic context. Also, the concern
of courts in enforcement of the employment and environmental laws
has been primarily with the actual act of violation and its impact on
individuals, and not so much on the effects of the violation on society
as a whole. Thus, employment and environmental laws have a differ-
ent and a much narrower scope than RICO, aimed at the protection of
individuals rather than U.S. businesses and industry.
RICO may be further viewed as analogous to antitrust and securi-
ties laws and distinct from employment and environmental laws be-
cause of its significant economic focus. Jonathan Turley has
distinguished between antitrust and securities laws, on the one hand,
as "market" statutes, and employment and environmental laws on the
other as "non-market" statutes. 138 This distinction, it is argued, is "ef-
fects" based, and corresponds to the different treatment received by
each. Courts are traditionally very concerned with "market" statutes
and compliance enforcement because of the potentially significant ef-
fect violations may have on the U.S. economy, and, consequently ap-
ply them broadly, often without hesitation against foreign entities. In
contrast, "non-market" statutes have a purely domestic focus. Viola-
tions of these statutes do not affect the economy to the same extent.
Thus, courts traditionally have applied them in a very limited manner
and only domestically. 139 RICO seems to fit clearly into Turley's defi-
nition of a "market" statute, since it was enacted to deter racketeering
activities primarily because of the significant effect on the U.S.
economy.
One court has explicitly recognized the similarities between laws
enacted based on economically harmful activity and the need for
138. Turley, supra note 116, at 601. By "market" statutes, Turley refers to those economi-
cally based in terms of congressional intent, and similarly, by "non-market", he refers to those
non-economically based.
139. Id. at 639.
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broad, if not extraterritorial application, of such legislation. In 1980,
the court in the Zenith case, 140 while examining a specific claim under
the Sherman Act, declared that its decision would encompass similar
claims under the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act,141 the Anti-
Dumping Act,142 and the Wilson Tariff Act143 because all were Ameri-
can economic regulations. The court stated, "Because we believe that
the issue with respect to the extraterritorial application of American
economic regulation are the same regardless of the particular statute
being applied, we will likewise refrain from extended discussion of
those additional bases for jurisdiction at this time." 144 Thus, at least
one court has recognized the distinction between market and non-mar-
ket law and applied economic laws extraterritorially.
In addition, RICO is more akin to law in the securities and anti-
trust areas than to those in the employment and environmental areas
with regard to the type of conduct regulated. The type of conduct
sought to be regulated by RICO may take several forms, from murder
to bribery to mail fraud, but all forms are "criminal" in nature. That
is, the activities bringing penalties under RICO center around fraudu-
lent intent, and would be viewed by most as wrongful conduct. Simi-
larly, securities fraud and anti-competitive practices, done with the
intent (assumed or explicit) of harming another's business, are likewise
reprehensible activites. By contrast, paying an employee less than
minimum wage or requiring over forty hours of work in one week
from an employee may appear cruel and inhumane, but these activities
are not generally thought of as "crimes." Instead, violations of most
employment laws are civil wrongs which can be enforced without re-
quiring criminal intent. Likewise, in the environmental arena, most
violations are not "criminal" and enforcement does not require the
element of intent. Often violations of employment and environmental
laws are merely management decisions based on the economic consid-
erations demanded of a free-market system. These violations lack the
fraudulent intent typically present in RICO violations.
Finally, the analysis employed by the courts in applying RICO is
more akin to that in the antitrust and securities areas in that the courts
feel broad application of the law is necessary in order to give any effect
to them. For example, in the Pacific & Arctic Railway case, discussed
supra, the court found jurisidiction over the defendants as necessary,
140. Zenith, 494 F. Supp. at 1183.
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1988).
142. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1976).
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1988).
144. Zenith, 494 F. Supp. at 1187 (emphasis added).
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because without it no one would be able to regulate the activities in
question and the antitrust laws would be rendered totally ineffec-
tive.145 Similarly, throughout the entire line of securities cases dis-
cussed above, the courts emphasized the necessity of allowing
jurisdiction so as to fulfill the congressional purposes behind the stat-
utes, or else, again, they would be rendered totally ineffective against
the activities in question. By contrast, the attitude of the courts in the
employment and environmental areas seems to be that the laws and
the purposes behind them will still be satisfied and effective with only
purely domestic applications. Economic laws, through international
transactions, are easily circumvented by departing the country and
controlling activities from a foreign haven. Environmental and em-
ployment laws, on the other hand, can be fully served by domestic
enforcement. Once a violator takes its business elsewhere, the viola-
tion no longer directly harms the United States, as the violators are
linked to the individual worker or land concerned.
The extraterritorial application of RICO is suggested by its con-
gressionally mandated purpose, its broad language, and its broad ap-
plications by the courts. Further, extraterritorial application of RICO
is logical because of the statute's similarity in purpose and interpreta-
tion of the courts to antitrust and securities laws. Effective application
may be achieved by borrowing form the jurisprudence in these areas.
First, since under RICO, "racketeering activity" is the conduct being
regulated, it seems logical that to have extraterritorial application, at
least some activity must be required to occur inside the boundaries of
the United States. The line of securities cases discussed earlier indi-
cates such a concern by the courts. Whether it be the requirement of
enough conduct such to provide "an essential link" between the viola-
tion and the United States as in Leasco, or simply conduct of "minimal
importance" as found in Bersch, it seems at least some of the allegedly
illegal conduct must occur inside U.S. borders in order for the federal
courts to appropriately assume jurisdiction.
As the primary focus of Congress in enacting RICO was on the
effects of racketeering activity on the U.S. economy, the "effects" test
from ALCOA would likely be the most desirable standard to adopt for
RICO. To recall, the "effects" test requires only that the actor have
intended detrimental effects to occur within the U.S. and to have actu-
ally produced these effects. This is appealing when considering the
extraterritorial application of RICO because Congress was concerned
145. 228 U.S. at 106.
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not just with the racketeering activity itself, but most of all with its
effect on the U.S. economy.
Second, the emphasis in the antitrust area on the consideration of
issues of international comity is appropriate for the extraterritorial ap-
plication of RICO.146 Successful extraterritorial application of RICO
will only be effected if considerations of relevant international interests
are addressed. Otherwise, retaliatory actions (such as blocking stat-
utes) and diplomacy conflicts, inter alia, will inevitably result, render-
ing RICO enforcement impossible and causing international strife
between the United States and other nations. More generally speak-
ing, any time the United States acts, either through its courts' deci-
sions or the Executive Branch's foreign policy, foreign interests are
affected. In fact, in today's global society, many actions taken by U.S.
courts and Congress, while appearing to be of little concern to inter-
ests abroad, have a strong impact on these interests. As courts have
recognized, it is essential that international concerns be considered
when deciding jurisdictional issues.
Moreover, due to the recent enactment of blocking statutes by sev-
eral foreign nations, the scope of RICO as extended to foreign defend-
ants must be viewed in concert with international interests in order to
be effective, especially in light of the treble damage remedy available to
civil plaintiffs. The emphasis on international considerations in the
Kasser decision provides a helpful starting point in the necessary juris-
prudence. The expansive list of factors suggested for use in the Man-
nington and Timberline cases further assists in providing an excellent
example of the numerous important considerations to be made in de-
termining whether the extraterritorial application of RICO in a given
case is appropriate. 147 Not only is such a thorough consideration of
international comity issues appropriate, but it is also necessary if
RICO is to be effective against foreign entities. It is in these ways that
the jurisprudence established in the antitrust and securities areas with
regard to extraterritorial application provides helpful guidance for
such an application of RICO.
In conclusion, the extraterritorial application of RICO should be
accepted, if not heralded, by the courts and Congress. RICO on its
face, with its ambiguous language, broad purposes, and the expansive
interpretation given by the Supreme Court, clearly allows such an ex-
tension. The main purpose of RICO is to eliminate the harmful effects
146. As discussed supra notes 59-90 and in accompanying text, the jurisprudence in the se-
curities area seems to be moving toward this type of emphasis as well.
147. For the same reasons, the Mannington and Timberline factors should also be followed in
the securities area when considering extraterritorial application.
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of organized crime on the U.S. economy. In order to accomplish this
goal, RICO must be applied to all violations which impact the United
States. This requires application of RICO to the activities of both do-
mestic and foreign entities. The mandate of RICO will continue un-
fulfilled if foreign entities are immune to RICO sanctions. Foreign
entities may flock to the United States to engage in organized crime
and escape punishment. Domestic entities may be able to circumvent
RICO by establishing foreign counterparts to undertake activities vio-
lative of the statute. Thus, the purpose of RICO necessitates extrater-
ritorial application. Also, in comparison with other areas of U.S.
regulation in which the issue of extraterritorial application has been
considered, RICO seems most similar in several aspects to the anti-
trust and securities areas, both of which have sanctioned extraterrito-
rial application. Moreover, the established jurisprudence of the
securities and antitrust areas, specifically the effects test and the em-
phasized consideration of international interests, seems most appropri-
ate for use in RICO's application, so as to fulfill Congress's intended
purposes and render RICO most effective in the international arena.
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